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Abstract
In many markets, like electricity or cloud comput-
ing markets, providers incur large costs for keep-
ing sufficient capacity in reserve to accommodate
demand fluctuations of a mostly fixed user base.
These costs are significantly affected by the un-
predictability of the users’ demand. Nevertheless,
standard mechanisms charge fixed per-unit prices
that do not depend on the variability of the users’
demand. In this paper, we study a variance-based
pricing rule in a two-provider market setting and
perform a game-theoretic analysis of the resulting
competitive effects. We show that an innovative
provider who employs variance-based pricing can
choose a pricing strategy that guarantees himself a
higher profit than using fixed per-unit prices for any
individually rational response of a provider playing
a fixed pricing strategy. We characterize all equi-
libria for the setting where both providers employ
variance-based pricing strategies. We find that,
while in equilibrium, the profits of the providers
may increase or decrease depending on their cost
functions, social welfare always weakly increases.
1 Introduction
In most markets with mostly fixed user bases, providers’ costs
are largely driven by how much buffer capacity they must
keep in reserve. This, in turn, depends on the variance of their
users’ demand. However, the predominant pricing mecha-
nisms employed in practice do not take this effect into ac-
count. Instead, prices are typically set on a per-unit basis,
such that every user pays the same for the same product.
In electricity markets, for example, a provider has to make
long-term supply decisions. But in real-time, supply and de-
mand always have to be perfectly balanced, which requires a
costly buffer infrastructure [Cramton, 2017]. If users would
always consume (almost) the same amount of energy, this
buffer could be far smaller than with widely varying user de-
mands. Nevertheless, users pay simple per MW/h prices.
Next, consider the market for mobile data. Mobile network
providers continuously expand their cell tower infrastructure
to be able to satisfy their users’ bandwidth needs under peak
demand [Lo´pez-Pe´rez et al., 2009]. However, most end-users
pay a fixed per-gigabyte-price, independent of when they con-
sume it or how variable their demand is.1
Finally, consider cloud computing markets, where cloud
providers must keep buffers of idle capacity in each compute
cluster to handle changing resource demands of already run-
ning jobs. Handling the variance of cloud users is particularly
difficult given that the resource needs of an individual job
may vary by a factor 10 or 100 over time (see Dierks et al.
[2019]). In this domain, the mixture of user types (i.e., their
average demand variance) significantly affects the provider’s
need to supply buffer capacity. Nevertheless, most cloud re-
sources are sold for a fixed price per core-hour, without regard
to the variability of the users’ demand.
Managing Demand via Sophisticated Pricing Classic ap-
proaches for dealing with varying demand include dynamic
pricing and congestion-based pricing [Muratori and Rizzoni,
2015; Rong et al., 2018; Truong-Huu and Tham, 2014].
These approaches focus on flattening demand peaks. A big
downside is that they make it unpredictable for users whether
they can obtain the product at a given price when they need it.
This puts providers who serve risk-averse users or users with
relatively uniform but inelastic demand at a competitive dis-
advantage. In some markets, like cloud computing, this effect
is so strong that providers never consider dynamic pricing for
their primary market offerings [Dierks and Seuken, 2019].
The effect even greatly hinders the adoption of dynamic pric-
ing in more suitable domains, like electricity markets [Joskow
and Wolfram, 2012], where customers are instead often only
exposed to fixed ’time-of-use’ tariffs [Urieli and Stone, 2016;
Celebi and Fuller, 2012].
Variance-based Pricing In this paper, we study variance-
based pricing, where part of the price the users pay depends
on the variance of their demand. Variance-based pricing was
recently proposed by Dierks et al. [2019] to reduce costs by
improving the demand prediction ability of a monopolistic
cloud provider. For a provider, in general markets, variance-
based pricing has the advantage that his low-variance users
pay lower prices and are thus impacted less by the buffer re-
quirements (which are mainly caused by high-variance users).
This is not only fairer, but importantly, it incentivizes users to
reduce their variance, which in turn reduces the provider’s
1Even in high-GDP countries, less than 10% of customers have
unlimited data plans [Ericsson, 2017].
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costs. In a monopolistic setting, the provider can obviously
use variance-based pricing to increase his profits. However,
in a competitive market environment, the effects are unclear,
because the competitive pricing pressure by other providers
may limit what he can achieve with variance-based pricing.
Overview of our Approach We analyze a duopoly of two
providers that compete for a continuum of user types. For
each provider, the cost per unit of a product depends on the
average variance of the users he attracts and providers either
conservatively employ constant per-unit prices or are willing
to innovate and employ per-unit prices that linearly depend
on the user’s variance. We restrict ourself to linear prices
here, because their simplicity makes them most plausible and
marketable in practice. We show that, as long as a provider’s
costs are not far larger than the costs of his competitor, uni-
laterally switching to variance-based pricing can be used to
obtain a higher profit for any reasonable constant response of
the other provider. We characterize all equilibria that arise if
both providers employ variance-based pricing. We also show
that, as long as providers are not symmetric in their cost func-
tions, the profits of both providers often increase, as they can
attract user types that their cost function is better suited to
serve. Finally, we show that the welfare may decrease if only
one provider employs variance-based pricing, but that it can
only weakly increase if both employ variance-based pricing.
Variance-based pricing is a type of price discrimination
[Varian, 1989; Mussa and Rosen, 1978]. However, in con-
trast to the classic price discrimination settings [Moorthy,
1984; Blattberg and Wisniewski, 1989; Gallego et al., 2006],
variance-based pricing does not discriminate based on user
preferences. Similarly, in our model there is neither a fixed
marginal cost of supplying a given user nor do costs depend
solely on the number of supplied products. As long as neither
provider charges for variance, they cannot price discriminate
at all and the problem becomes similar to a Bertrand competi-
tion [Baye and Kovenock, 2017]. In order to isolate the com-
petitive effects caused by variance-based pricing, we assume
that both providers offer the same product; thus, product dif-
ferentiation (e.g., [Feng et al., 2013]) does not take place.
2 Preliminaries
We consider a market setting with two providers and a con-
tinuum of users to which the providers want to sell their prod-
ucts. We study a simple two-period model: in the first period,
the providers choose their pricing strategies; in the second
period, the users choose a provider to buy the product from.
2.1 Formal Model
Each user is associated with a real-valued type t ∈ [0, tmax].
We keep this type general, but in practice it can be assumed to
encode the variance of a user’s demand. To keep the notations
simple, we normalize each user’s expected demand to 1. For a
randomly chosen user, her type is distributed as a continuous
random variable with pdf f(t) and cdf F (t). We do not model
fluctuations in the mixture of user types over time.
Each provider’s strategy space consists of his choice of
price function ρi. We restrict ρi = (p
f
i , p
`
i) to a fixed price
pfi per unit of the product (independent of the user type) and
a second linearly type-based charge p`it per unit of the prod-
uct.2 The overall payment per unit of the product for a user
with type t is given by ρi(t) = p
f
i + p
`
it. Going forward, we
refer to providers that are willing to choose any pfi , p
`
i ∈ R
as innovative and those who do not adopt the new pricing
scheme and restrict themselves to p`i = 0 as conservative.
Given the provider’s price functions, and depending on a
user’s own type, each user chooses to obtain the product ei-
ther from provider 1 or 2. We denote a strategy profile for
all user types by σ(t) : [0, tmax] → {1, 2}. In this paper,
we do not model the users’ values for product consumption.3
Consequently, the users’ utility function is simply equal to
their negative payments. Throughout the paper, given price
functions (ρ1, ρ2), we assume that users only play utility-
maximizing (i.e., payment minimizing) user strategy profiles.
Formally, we assume that σ(t) = argmini {ρi(t)} for all t.
As we will see, it is often in a provider’s best interest to
play essentially the same strategy as their opponent, which
makes tie-breaking rules for the user sub-game very impor-
tant. To avoid that tie breaking for ρ1 = ρ2 gives rise to
arbitrary user strategy profiles that would not arise in prac-
tice, we restrict user strategy profiles to those that arise as the
limit of uniquely (up to a null-set) utility-maximizing user
strategy profiles for some sequence of pricing functions con-
verging to (ρ1, ρ2). We also call these user strategy profiles
enforceable, as at least one provider can enforce them by
deviating from (ρ1, ρ2) at only an infinitesimal profit loss.
With linearly type-based prices, this limits strategy profiles
to any form where all users with type greater than some cut-
off point tˆ join one provider i and those with lower type join
the other provider. To denote this, we also write σ = [0, tˆ]→i
or σ = [tˆ, tmax]→i. Note that any σ is uniquely defined by
this, as all other users choose the other provider. Further, we
denote by µ(a, b) the average type of all users with type in
[a, b], i.e., µ(a, b) =
∫ b
a
f(t)tdt
F (b)−F (a) .
Each provider’s costs do not only depend on how many
units of his product he sells in realization, but on how many
units he has to supply given a user strategy profile σ. A
provider’s cost function cj(σ) consequently is a function of
the whole user strategy profile and independent of any given
user’s type. We assume that cj(σ) is strictly increasing in the
expected type of a randomly drawn user that joins provider j’s
market under σ. Overloading notation, we also write ci(a, b)
for the cost of provider i if all users in [a, b] (and no other
users) choose him.
In many applications, splitting a given population of users
between two identical providers causes higher overall costs
than if one provider would obtain all users, as that one
provider could always provision for both sub-populations
separately. We call such cost functions that are convex in
2 As supply decisions, and therefore costs, do not depend on a
user’s true type, but on the providers predicted type, we assume that
providers know each realized users type. In practice, user bases are
often mostly fixed, so provider can learn a users type over time.
3In the markets we study, essentially every user is served by some
provider, as costs are very low compared to most users’ values and
competition ensures that prices are close to costs.
relation to splitting the market split-convex, i.e. ci() is split-
convex if for all tˆ ∈ [0, tmax] it holds
F (tˆ)c1(0, tˆ) + (1− F (tˆ))c1(tˆ, tmax) ≥ c1(0, tmax).
If the inequality holds with strictly greater (i.e., >), we call
the cost function strictly split-convex.
A provider’s utility is his expected profit pij per customer
in a population, which is given by
pij(ρ1, ρ2, σ) =
∫
t:σ(t)=j
(ρj(t)− cj(σ))f(t)dt (1)
Given this model, we call a strategy for provider i ∈
{1, 2} an individually rational response to any given strat-
egy ρ−i of the other provider if there exists a enforceable
utility-maximizing user strategy profile σ that gives provider
i weakly positive profit, i.e., pii(ρi, ρ−i, σ) ≥ 0.
2.2 Equilibrium Concept
We use the following equilibrium concept for our analysis.
Definition 1. A tuple (ρ1, ρ2, σ) is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium
(BNE) if σ is utility maximizing for (ρ1, ρ2) and for i ∈ {1, 2}
there exist no ρˆi 6= ρi and σˆ such that σˆ is utility maximizing
for (ρˆi, ρ−i) and
pii(ρˆi, ρ−i, σˆ) > pii(ρi, ρ−i, σ) (2)
Note that when ρ1 = ρ2, users are indifferent between all
user strategy profiles, but our equilibrium definition mandates
that tie breaking is done in such a way that no provider has
an incentive to deviate infinitesimally only to secure himself
a different user strategy profile. In practice, a combination of
external factors and bounded rationality imply that providers
do not move their prices to a tie or even infinitesimally close
to each other, at best achieving −BNEs. Essentially, price
differentiations that are too small are not marketable.
3 Profit Analysis with Conservative Providers
First, we now analyze the case where both providers are con-
servative, i.e., restricted to p`1 = p
`
2 = 0. Since they can-
not split the market through pricing differences, the resulting
game is similar to a classic Bertrand competition. Thus, if the
providers’ costs for the whole population are symmetric, they
cannot extract any profit, while for non-symmetric providers,
the provider with lower costs for serving the whole market
can potentially extract the cost difference as a profit.
Proposition 1. Let both providers be conservative, i.e., p`1 =
p`2 = 0. W.l.o.g. assume c1(0, tmax) ≤ c2(0, tmax). Then in
any BNE (ρ1, ρ2, σ) the following holds:
pf1 = p
f
2 ∈ [c1(0, tmax), c2(0, tmax)] (3)
and
pi1(ρ1, ρ2, σ) =p
f
1 − c1(0, tmax) (4)
pi2(ρ1, ρ2, σ) =0 (5)
Proof. Note that any tuple (ρ1, ρ2, σ) with p
f
1 = p
f
2 ∈
[c1(0, tmax), c2(0, tmax)] and σ = [0, tmax]→1 is a BNE as
neither provider has an advantageous deviation. All users
already choose provider 1, so decreasing his price only re-
duces his profit, while any price increase makes him lose
all users. Since all users choose him, his profit is simply
pi1(ρ1, ρ2, σ) = p
f
1 − c1(0, tmax). Any lower price for
provider 2 on the other hand would lead to all users choosing
him, but he would make a negative profit per user. Increasing
his price would have no effect on his profit, as no users choose
him. Without users, he trivially makes zero profit. As a spe-
cial case, when c1(0, tmax) = c2(0, tmax), then, by the same
argument, pf1 = p
f
2 = c2(0, tmax) with σ = [0, tmax]→2
is an equilibrium as well, with both providers obtaining zero
profit.
We now show that these are the only BNEs, by showing
that any other “potential BNE” leads to a contradiction. First,
note that when pf1 < p
f
2 , every user strictly prefers provider 1.
But there always exists a pˆf1 with p
f
1 < pˆ
f
1 < p
f
2 for which ev-
ery user still strictly prefers provider 1, but with a higher pay-
ment. Therefore, pf1 = p
f
2 has to hold in equilibrium. Now,
if pf1 = p
f
2 < c1(0, tmax), provider 1 would make a loss for
every user. On the other hand, if pf1 = p
f
2 > c2(0, tmax), then
for any σ = [0, tmax]→i, the other provider−iwould have an
advantageous deviation in any pˆf−i with c2(0, tmax) < pˆ
f
−i <
pf1 = p
f
2 . Taken together, this means that there can be no
other BNE than those characterized by the proposition.
Going forward, we denote these BNEs with two conser-
vative providers as constant BNEs. It should be noted that
while all pf1 = p
f
2 ∈ [c1(0, tmax), c2(0, tmax)] are equilib-
rium prices, any pf1 = p
f
2 < c2(0, tmax) only does not lead to
a loss for provider 2 because he obtains no users. This makes
pf1 = c2(0, tmax) the only non-pathological equilibrium.
4 Profit Analysis with Innovative Providers
In this section, we analyze the profit when either only one or
both providers are innovative. As a first step, we bound the
profit in any best response by the optimal profit a provider
could attain if he could unilaterally choose the tie-breaking
rule between utility-maximizing user strategy profiles.
Proposition 2. Assume provider 2 plays strategy ρ2 =
(pf2 , p
`
2). Then, for any ρ1 6= ρ2 and any σ that is util-
ity maximizing for ρ1, ρ2, it holds that pi1(ρ1, ρ2, σ) = 0 or
pi1(ρ1, ρ2, σ) < pi1(ρ2, ρ2, σ).
Proof. First note that for any ρ1 6= ρ2, by the linearity of
the price function, there exists a unique tˆ at which payments
in both markets are the same, i.e., pf1 + tˆp
`
1 = p
f
2 + tˆp
`
2.
For any utility maximizing σ, users with type below tˆ choose
one provider and those above the other. Now consider some
ρ1 6= ρ2, pi1(ρ1, ρ2, σ) > 0 and tˆ to be the corresponding
cutoff. If pf1 ≤ pf2 , p`1 ≥ p`2, then any utility-maximizing user
strategy profile is of the form σ = [0, tˆ]→1 and it holds
pi1(ρ1, ρ2, σ) =
∫ tˆ
0
f(t)(pf1 + tp
`
1 − c1(0, tˆ))dt (6)
=
∫ tˆ
0
f(t)(pf2 + tˆp
`
2 − tˆp`1 + tp`1 − c1(0, tˆ))dt (7)
<
∫ tˆ
0
f(t)(pf2 + tˆp
`
2 − c1(0, tˆ))dt (8)
=pi1(ρ2, ρ2, σ) (9)
Similarly for pf1 ≥ pf2 , p`1 ≤ p`2.
It directly follows that both providers play the same strat-
egy in any BNE, even if one provider is conservative.
Corollary 1. In any BNE it holds that ρ1 = ρ2.
We now separately consider the cases where either only
one or both providers are willing to employ linear pricing.
4.1 One Provider is Innovative
Since all providers have to play the same strategy in any BNE,
only one provider being innovative precludes the existence of
a BNE unless both providers’ cost functions are very close to
each other.
Theorem 1. Let provider 2 be conservative, i.e., p`2 = 0 and
provider 1 be innovative. There exists a BNE if and only if
there exists no tˆ ∈ [0, tmax] with
c1(0, tmax)− F (tˆ)c1(0, tˆ) (10)
≥(1− F (tˆ))(c1(0, tmax)− c2(0, tmax)) (11)
If a BNE exists, it is equal to a constant BNE.
Proof. By Corollary 1, in any BNE both providers will use
constant pricing functions and for any two constant pricing
functions that are not part of a constant BNE there exist con-
stant deviations. By Proposition 2, any response of provider
1 is worse than him freely choosing the user strategy profile
without changing his pricing function. He can enforce any
user strategy profile where he only obtains users with types
lower than tˆ, so any such user strategy profile has to give him
weakly lower profit than taking the whole market or he will do
so for some tˆ < tmax. If provider 1 gets the lower part of the
market, the users that choose provider 2 have a higher aver-
age variance, and he therefore has a higher cost per user, than
if he had the whole market. Provider 2 therefore either has to
make negative profit (and thus will deviate) or can increases
his profit by slightly decreasing his price pf2 and taking the
whole market.
This means that usually, providers have an incentive to be-
come innovative if their competition is conservative, but do-
ing so and myopically optimizing profit leads to instability.
Instead, an innovative provider has to be aware of their mar-
ket power and utilize it in order to obtain a profit increase.
Doing so, provider 1 can guarantee himself strictly positive
payoff whenever there is any interval of users for which his
costs are lower than provider 2’s costs for all users.
Theorem 2. Let provider 2 be conservative, i.e., p`2 = 0. If
there exists 0 < t¯ < tmax with
c1(0, t¯) < c2(0, tmax) (12)
and c1(0, t¯) < c1(0, tmax) < 2c1(0, t¯), (13)
then there exists a strategy ρ1 with p`1 > 0 that guarantees
provider 1 a non-negative payoff for any pf2 and a positive
payoff for any individually rational response of provider 2.
Proof. Note that for any pf1 < c2(0, tmax), p
`
1 > 0, provider
2 can only achieve a positive profit if he plays pf2 = p
f
1 + tˆp
`
1
for some tˆ > 0. To guarantee a positive payoff for provider 1
with such a pf1 it therefore suffices that
pi1(ρ1, ρ2, tˆ) =
∫ tˆ
0
f(t)(pf1 + tp
`
1 − c1(0, tˆ))dt > 0 (14)
for all tˆ. For 0 < t¯ < tmax with c1(0, t¯) < c2(0, tmax) and
c1(0, t¯) < c1(0, tmax) < 2c1(0, t¯). (15)
choose ρ1 such that p
f
1 = c1(0, t¯) and p
`
1 =
c1(0,t¯)∫ t¯
0
f(t)tdt
. Then
it holds for tˆ ≤ t¯:
pi1(ρ1, ρ2, tˆ) =
∫ tˆ
0
f(t)(pf1 + tp
`
1 − c1(0, tˆ))dt (16)
>
∫ tˆ
0
f(t)(pf1 + tp
`
1 − c1(0, t¯))dt (17)
=
∫ tˆ
0
f(t)(tp`1)dt (18)
>0 (19)
For tˆ > t¯ it holds
pi1(ρ1, ρ2, tˆ) (20)
=
∫ tˆ
0
f(t)(pf1 + tp
`
1 − c1(0, tˆ))dt (21)
=
∫ tˆ
0
f(t)(t
c1(0, t¯)∫ t¯
0
f(t)tdt
− c1(0, tˆ)− c1(0, t¯))dt (22)
>
∫ tˆ
0
f(t)(c1(0, t¯)− c1(0, tˆ)− c1(0, t¯))dt (23)
=
∫ tˆ
0
f(t)(2c1(0, t¯)− c1(0, tˆ)dt (24)
>0 (25)
Therefore, ρ1 guarantees provider 1 positive profit for σ =
[0, tˆ]→1 with any tˆ ∈ [0, tmax].
This means that provider 1 can enforce positive profit,
which is especially attractive if he could only obtain zero
profit as a conservative provider. As we can see from the
proof, a possible such pricing strategy with positive payoff is
given by pf1 = c1(0, t¯) and p
`
1 =
c1(0,t¯)∫ t¯
0
f(t)tdt
.
This still leaves the question whether a provider that ob-
tained positive profit as a conservative provider should also
become innovative. As the following proposition shows, the
answer is usually yes.
Theorem 3. Let provider 2 be conservative, i.e., p`2 = 0.
If provider 1 obtains strictly positive profit in some constant
BNE then there exists a strategy ρ1 with p`1 > 0 that, for
any individually rational response of provider 2, guarantees
provider 1 greater profit than in any constant BNE.
Proof. Recall that by Proposition 1, if provider 1 has positive
profit in some constant equilibrium then
c1(0, tmax) < c2(0, tmax). (26)
Let t¯ be a type such that
t¯ = argmint
c2(t, tmax)− c2(0, tmax)
t
(27)
For any  > 0 with  < µ(0, tmax)
c2(t¯,tmax)−c2(0,tmax))
t¯ ,
let ρ1 = (p
f
1 , p
`
1) with p
f
1 = c2(0, tmax) −  and p`1 =
c2(t¯,tmax)−c2(0,tmax)
t¯ . Then for any p
f
2 provider 2 obtains no
users or there exists a t > tˆ such that he obtains all users with
type t > tˆ and his profit is given by
pi2(ρ1, ρ2, σ) =
∫ tmax
tˆ
f(t)(pf2 − c2(tˆ, tmax))dt (28)
=
∫ tmax
tˆ
f(t)(pf1 + tˆp
`
1 − c2(tˆ, tmax))dt (29)
≤
∫ tmax
tˆ
f(t)(pf1 + tˆ
c2(tˆ, tmax)− pf1 + 
tˆ
(30)
− c2(tˆ, tmax))dt (31)
=0− (F (tmax)− F (tˆ)) (32)
Therefore, provider 2 has no individually rational response
for which he obtains any users.
It follows that for any rational response of provider 2 and
any  < µ(0, tmax)
c2(t¯,tmax)−c2(0,tmax)
t¯ provider 1’s profit is
pi1(ρ1, ρ2, σ) (33)
=
∫ tmax
0
f(t)(pf1 + tp
`
1 − c1(0, tmax))dt (34)
=c2(0, tmax)− c1(0, tmax)−  (35)
+ µ(0, tmax)
c2(t¯, tmax))− c2(0, tmax)
t¯
(36)
>c2(0, tˆ)− c1(0, tˆ) (37)
By Proposition 1, the profit therefore is greater than the profit
in any constant BNE.
4.2 Both Providers are Innovative
Once one provider starts to employ linear pricing, the other
provider might at some point also want to follow. Conse-
quently, we now look at the case where both providers are
innovative. When both providers employ linear pricing, the
first provider loses much of the additional power he had when
the other provider stayed conservative. Consequently, there is
no general guarantee that he can still improve his profit. But
as long as the cost functions are strictly split-convex, he can
still guarantee himself that profits do not decrease compared
to any constant BNE.
Theorem 4. Assume the cost function of provider 2 is strictly
split-convex. Then there exists a strategy ρ1 with p`1 > 0
such that, for any individually rational response of provider
2, guarantees provider 1 greater or equal profit than in any
constant price BNE.
Proof. If provider 1 obtains 0 profit in all constant BNEs,
nothing has to be shown. Otherwise, assume provider 1
plays ρ1 = (p
f
1 , p
`
1) with p
`
1 =
d
dt |tmaxc2(0, tmax) and
pf1 + p
`
1µ(0, tmax) = c2(0, tmax).
By Proposition 2, we know that for all ρ2 with utility-
maximizing σ = [0, tˆ]→2 it holds that pi2(ρ1, ρ2, σ) ≤
pi2(ρ1, ρ1, σ) and from strict convexity it follows
c2(0, tˆ) (38)
>c2(0, tmax) (39)
+
d
dt
|tmaxc2(0, tmax)(µ(0, tˆ)− µ(0, tmax)) (40)
=pf1 + p
`
1µ(0, tmax) + p
`
1(µ(0, tˆ)− µ(0, tmax)) (41)
and therefore
pi2(ρ1, ρ1, σ) =
∫ tˆ
0
f(t)(pf1 + tp
`
1 − c2(0, tˆ))dt (42)
<
∫ tˆ
0
f(t)(pf1 + tp
`
1 − pf1 − p`1µ(0, tmax) (43)
− p`1(µ(0, tˆ)− µ(0, tmax)))dt (44)
=
∫ tˆ
0
f(t)(tp`1 − p`1µ(0, tˆ))dt (45)
=0 (46)
Similarly for σ = [0, tˆ]→1. Therefore, any individually ra-
tional response of provider 2 has to guarantee user strategy
profile σ = [0, tmax]→1, for which provider 1 has profit
pi1(ρ1, ρ2, σ) = c1(0, tmax) − c2(0, tmax), i.e. by Propo-
sition 1 the highest possible profit for any constant BNE.
On the other hand, if both providers are symmetric and
their costs are split-convex, moving to linear prices cannot
lead to any profit in equilibrium.
Proposition 3. Assume providers are symmetric, i.e., c1(·) =
c2(·), and costs are split-convex. Then there can be no BNE
with strictly positive profit for either provider.
Proof. If, w.l.o.g., all users prefer provider 1 and he obtains
strictly positive payoff, provider 2 obtains zero profit but can
deviate to pf2 = p
f
1 − , p`2 = p`1 to obtain strictly positive
payoff for  > 0 small enough. Therefore, in any potential
BNE, the market is split between providers or both obtain
zero profit. Assume (ρ1, ρ2, σ) is a BNE and w.l.o.g. σ =
[0, t¯]→1 for some 0 < tˆ < tmax. By Corollary 1 we can
assume ρ1 = ρ2. Then, for any  > 0 and ρˆ2 = (p
f
2 − , p`2)
all users prefer provider 2, resulting in profit
pi2(ρ1, ρˆ2, [0, tmax]→2) (47)
=
∫ tmax
0
f(t)(pf2 − + tp`2 − c2(0, tmax))dt (48)
=
∫ tmax
0
f(t)(pf2 + tp
`
2)dt− − c2(0, tmax) (49)
≥
∫ tmax
0
f(t)(pf2 + tp
`
2)dt−  (50)
− (1− F (tˆ))c2(tˆ, tmax) + F (tˆ)c2(0, tˆ) (51)
=pi2(ρ1, ρ2, σ) + pi1(ρ1, ρ2, σ)−  (52)
If pi2(ρ1, ρ2, σ) > 0 or pi1(ρ1, ρ2, σ) > 0, it follows that for
 small enough, pi2(ρ1, ρˆ2, σˆ) > pi2(ρ1, ρ2, σ), contradicting
our assumption that (ρ1, ρ2, σ) is a BNE. Thus, it must hold
that pi2(ρ1, ρ2, σ) = 0 and pi1(ρ1, ρ2, σ) = 0.
When cost functions are not split-convex, symmetric
providers still always obtain the same profit in any BNE, even
though it can be positive.
Proposition 4. Assume providers are symmetric, i.e., c1(·) =
c2(·). Then, in any BNE it holds pi1(ρ1, ρ2, σ) =
pi2(ρ1, ρ2, σ).
Proof. Follows directly by noting that for symmetric
providers, whoever has lower profits could switch users with
the other provider by decreasing prices infinitesimally.
By definition, whether a tuple (ρ1, ρ2, σ) is a BNE is de-
cided via a three-dimensional condition space, as the profit
has to be better than the profit for any other tuple (ρˆ1, ρˆ2, σˆ).
This makes it very hard to evaluate whether a given tuple is a
BNE. The following theorem instead characterizes equilibria
by a one-dimensional condition space, greatly reducing the
complexity of checking candidate equilibria.
Theorem 5. A tuple (ρ1, ρ2, [0, tˆ]→i) is a BNE if and only if
ρ1 = ρ2 and
F (tˆ)ci(0, tˆ)− F (a)ci(0, a) (53)
≤(F (tˆ)− F (a)(pfi + µ(a, t)p`i) (54)
≤(1− F (a))c−i(a, tmax)− (1− F (tˆ))c−i(tˆ, tmax) (55)
for all 0 ≤ a ≤ tmax. If the providers are not symmetric, it
also has to hold for all 0 ≤ a ≤ tmax
F (a)(pfi + µ(0, a)p
`
i − c−i(0, a)) (56)
≤(1− F (tˆ))(pfi + µ(tˆ, tmax)p`i − c−i(tˆ, tmax)) (57)
and
(1− F (a))(pfi + µ(a, tmax)p`i − ci(a, tmax)) (58)
≤F (tˆ)(pfi + µ(0, tˆ)p`i − ci(0, tˆ)) (59)
Proof. A tuple (ρ1, ρ2, [0, tˆ]→i) is a BNE if no provider has
an advantageous deviation. From Proposition 2 we know
that any deviation with a different price vector is worse
than keeping the same price vector and choosing the devi-
ating provider’s most-preferred utility-maximizing user strat-
egy profile. Thus, the tuple is a BNE if and only if moving
to any different user strategy profile (weakly) decreases both
providers’ profits. W.l.o.g. assume i = 2. Then changing to
any any [0, a]→i with 0 ≤ a < tˆ yields a profit change for
Provider 1 of
(1− F (tˆ))(c1(tˆ, tmax)− c1(a, tmax) (60)
+
∫ tˆ
a
f(t)(pf1 + tp
`
1 − c1(a, tmax))dt (61)
=(1− F (tˆ))c1(tˆ, tmax)− (1− F (a))c1(a, tmax) (62)
+ (F (tˆ)− F (a))(pf1 + µ(a, t)p`1) (63)
while with tˆ < a < tmax it yields a change of
(1− F (a))(c1(tˆ, tmax)− c1(a, tmax) (64)
−
∫ a
tˆ
f(t)(pf1 + tp
`
1 − c1(tˆ, tmax))dt (65)
=(1− F (tˆ))c1(tˆ, tmax) (66)
− (1− F (a))c1(a, tmax) (67)
+ (F (tˆ)− F (a))(pf1 + µ(a, t)p`1) (68)
Similarly, the profit change for provider 2 is given by
F (a)c2(0, tˆ) (69)
−
∫ tˆ
a
f(t)(pf1 + tp
`
1 − c2(0, tˆ))dt (70)
=F (tˆ)c2(0, tˆ)− F (a)c2(0, a) (71)
− (F (tˆ)− F (a))(pf1 + µ(a, t)p`1) (72)
for a < tˆ and
F (tˆ)c2(0, tˆ) (73)
+
∫ a
tˆ
f(t)(pf1 + tp
`
1c2(0, a))dt (74)
=F (tˆ)c2(0, tˆ)− F (a)c2(0, a) (75)
− (F (tˆ)− F (a))(pf1 + µ(a, t)p`1) (76)
for a > tˆ. Bounding all of these expressions above by zero
yields the first half of the theorem.
Equivalently, it has to hold for user strategy profiles that
switch which provider obtains the low variance users (i.e.
[0, a]→−i):∫ a
0
f(t)(pf1 + tp
`
1 − c1(0, a))dt (77)
−
∫ tmax
tˆ
f(t)(pf1 + tp
`
1 − c1(tˆ, tmax))dt (78)
=F (a)(pf1 + µ(0, a)p
`
1 − c1(0, a)) (79)
− (1− F (tˆ))(pf1 + µ(tˆ, tmax)p`1 − c1(tˆ, tmax)) (80)
≤0 (81)
and ∫ tmax
a
f(t)(pf1 + tp
`
1 − c2(a, tmax))dt (82)
−
∫ tˆ
0
f(t)(pf1 + tp
`
1 − c2(0, tˆ))dt (83)
=(1− F (a))(pf1 + µ(a, tmax)p`1 − c2(a, tmax)) (84)
− F (tˆ)(pf1 + µ(0, tˆ)p`1 − c2(0, tˆ)) (85)
≤0 (86)
If the providers are symmetric, this is equivalent to the con-
ditions with automatically satisfied if the condition without
switching is satisfied.
While this fully characterizes all BNEs, it is a very techni-
cal characterization. While it can be used to check whether
a given tuple (ρ1, ρ2, σ) is a BNE, it does not enable an easy
search procedure for finding candidate BNEs. The following
corollary helps with that, identifying a small subset of user
strategy profiles that can be part of a BNE and reducing the
search for BNEs to a one-dimensional search.
Corollary 2. If a tuple (ρ1, ρ2, σ) with 0 < tˆ < tmax is a
BNE and the cost functions are differentiable, then it holds
d
dt
|tˆF (t)c2(0, t) (87)
=f(tˆ)(pf + tˆp`). (88)
=
d
dt
|tˆ − (1− F (t))c1(t, tmax) (89)
Proof. Note that for t = tˆ it trivially holds
F (tˆ)c2(0, tˆ)− F (t)c2(0, t) (90)
=(F (tˆ))− F (t)(pf1 + µ(t, t)p`1) (91)
=(1− F (t))c1(t, tmax)− (1− F (tˆ))c1(tˆ, tmax). (92)
Theorem 5 further gives us that the three expressions have
the same ordering for all t, therefore especially for all t in
any small neighborhood around tˆ. Therefore, all three expres-
sions need to have the same derivative in t at point t = tˆ.
Given a cutoff point tˆ, all potential equilibrium price func-
tions lie on a line defined by Equation (88). To find a BNE,
all that remains to be done is to check whether tˆ with any of
the (pf , p`) on that line satisfy the condition of Theorem 5.
5 Welfare Analysis
The social welfare of the market is given as the neg-
ative sum of the expected costs of both providers, i.e.,
w(ρ1, ρ2, [0, t]→i) = −F (tˆ)ci(0, tˆ)−(1−F (tˆ))c−i(tˆ, tmax).
The social welfare in any constant BNE then follows directly
from Proposition 1.
Corollary 3. Let both providers be conservative and w.l.o.g.
assume c1(0, tmax) ≤ c2(0, tmax). Then the social welfare
in any BNE is w(ρ1, ρ2, σ) = −c1(0, tmax).
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 1.
If only one provider is innovative, the social welfare often
goes down, as the innovative provider can employ his market
power to force the conservative provider to give up part of
the market, even if it increases overall costs. But if both are
innovative, he loses this power and in BNE, the social welfare
cannot decrease compared to any constant BNE.
Proposition 5. W.l.o.g. assume c1(0, tmax) ≤ c2(0, tmax).
The social welfare in BNE with both providers being innova-
tive is higher than the social welfare in any constant BNE,
i.e., w(ρ1, ρ2, σ) ≥ −c1(0, tmax).
Proof. Recall that the social welfare is given by (−1) times
the sum of the expected costs, i.e., w(ρ1, ρ2.[0, t]→i) =
(−1) (F (tˆ)ci(0, tˆ) + (1− F (tˆ))c−i(tˆ, tmax)). Con-
sequently, whenever all users choose provider 1, the
social welfare is the same as in any constant BNE, i.e.,
w(ρ1, ρ2, [0, tmax]→1) = −c1(0, tmax).
We now show the claim of the proposition by contradic-
tion. Assume (ρ1, ρ2, [0, tˆ]→i) for i ∈ 1, 2 is an innovative
BNE where the social welfare is strictly lower than the so-
cial welfare in any constant BNE. Then consequently, the
social welfare under (ρ1, ρ2, [0, tˆ]→i) is also strictly lower
than under (ρ1, ρ2, [0, tmax]→1), i.e., the sum of the ex-
pected costs is strictly higher; formally: F (tˆ)ci(0, tˆ) + (1 −
F (tˆ))c−i(tˆ, tmax) > c1(0, tmax).
Additionally, by Corollary 1, we can assume that
ρ1 = ρ2. This means that the payment of any user
is independent of which provider he chooses, and there-
fore the sum of the revenues of both providers does
not change between (ρ1, ρ2, [0, tˆ]→i) and (ρ1, ρ2, [0, tˆ]→1).
Taken together, when going from the first profile to
the second profile, the sum of the revenues stay the
same but the costs strictly decrease, which implies
that pi1(ρ1, ρ2, [0, tmax]→1) > pi1(ρ1, ρ2, [0, tˆ]→i) +
pi2(ρ1, ρ2, [0, tˆ]→i). Therefore, (ρ1, ρ2, [0, tˆ]→i) can not be
a BNE, a contradiction.
6 Numerical Example
In this section, we illustrate our results via a simple numerical
example. We assume that user types are uniformly distributed
on [0, 1]. Further, we assume provider 1 has cost function
c1(a, b) = 0.0125+µ(a, b)
2 and provider 2 has cost function
c2(a, b) = 0.2 +
µ(a,b)2
4 . Thus, provider 1 has a lower cost
for low types but a higher cost for high types than provider
2, and both providers have the same cost for the whole user
population. From Proposition 1, we know that when both
providers are conservative, there are only zero-profit BNEs.
They occur at pf1 = p
f
2 = 0.2625 with a welfare of −0.2625.
We now consider each provider unilaterally switching to
linear prices (as described in Theorem 2). Figure 1 shows
the profit increase that provider 1 could obtain by unilaterally
innovating while provider 2 remains conservative; Figure 2
shows the analogous result for when provider 2 becomes in-
novative. We see that provider 1 innovating leads to the over-
all better result for both providers. This is not surprising, con-
sidering that the innovative provider obtains the lower type
provider 1
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0.30
profit
best response
Figure 1: Profit of both providers for all conservative responses of
provider 2 to provider 1 playing (pf1 = 0.215, p
`
1 = 0.5309).
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Figure 2: Profit of both providers for all conservative responses of
provider 1 to provider 2 playing (pf2 = 0.2506, p
`
2 = 0.6188).
portion of the market in which provider 1 has lower costs. At
the best response of provider 2, the social welfare therefore
increases to −0.2077. Nonetheless, if provider 2 innovates
instead, he can still obtain a profit of 0.0442 at provider 1’s
best constant response of pf1 = 0.3941. Since here provider
2 uses the power of his larger strategy space as an innovative
provider to force provider 1 to obtain a high type population
interval (for which provider 1 has higher costs) social welfare
unsurprisingly decreases to −0.3846.
For the case where both providers are willing to employ
linear pricing, Corollary 2 provides us with conditions on
candidate equilibrium user strategy profiles. For our exam-
ple, we can use those conditions to find four cutoff points:
σ = [0, 0.595]→1, σ = [0.5431, 1]→1, σ = [0, 1]→1 and
σ = [0, 0]→1. All of these except for σ = [0, 0.595]→1 do not
satisfy Theorem 5 and are eliminated. For σ = [0, 0.595]→1
any pf1 = p
f
2 ∈ [0, 0.0409], p`1 = p`2 = 0.2784−p
f
1
0.595 satisfy
Theorem 5 and form equilibrium pricing strategies. To vi-
sualize an example BNE, Figure 3 shows the profit of both
providers for pf1 = p
f
2 = 0 and p
`
1 = p
`
2 = 0.4676 given
any utility maximizing σ = [0, t]→1. We see that neither
provider wants to deviate to enforce a different user strategy
profile σ = [0, t]→1 than σ = [0, 0.595]→1. Social welfare at
this BNE is −0.2055, which is even slightly better than when
only provider 1 was innovative. However, the increased com-
petition leads to a markedly lower profit for both providers
than when only provider 1 was innovative, suggesting that it
can be in a conservative provider’s interest not to become in-
novative if the other provider is already innovative.
provider 1
provider 2
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Figure 3: Profit of both providers for different σ = [0, t]→1
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the competitive effects of
providers utilizing linear pricing rules in settings where a
provider’s costs depend on the average type of all his users.
We have shown that, while a single provider innovating of-
ten leads to non-existence of BNEs, the innovating provider
can exert the additional market power of his larger strategy
space to unilaterally set prices that increase his profit for all
individually rational responses of a conservative provider. We
have further characterized all equilibria where both providers
employ linear pricing. We have shown that while much of
this additional market power is lost once the other provider
also adopts linear pricing, the increased strategy space allows
providers to split the market more closely along differences
in their cost functions, often increasing both providers’ prof-
its and social welfare. In conclusion, linear variance-based or
type-based prices often seem superior to constant prices even
under competition. Future work should study secondary ef-
fects like incentivizing users to actively lower their variance.
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